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Updating the Parameters of a Threshold Scheme by
Minimal Broadcast
S. G. Barwick, Wen-Ai Jackson, and Keith M. Martin
Abstract—Threshold schemes allow secret data to be protected
among a set of participants in such a way that only a prespecified
threshold of participants can reconstruct the secret from private
information (shares) distributed to them on a system setup using
secure channels. We consider the general problem of designing
unconditionally secure threshold schemes whose defining param-
eters (the threshold and the number of participants) can later
be changed by using only public channel broadcast messages. In
this paper, we are interested in the efficiency of such threshold
schemes, and seek to minimize storage costs (size of shares) as
well as optimize performance in low-bandwidth environments
by minimizing the size of necessary broadcast messages. We
prove a number of lower bounds on the smallest size of broadcast
message necessary to make general changes to the parameters of a
threshold scheme in which each participant already holds shares
of minimal size. We establish the tightness of these bounds by
demonstrating optimal schemes.
Index Terms—Cryptology, secret-sharing schemes, threshold
schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
L ET and be integers satisfying . A -threshold scheme [3], [17] is a system for sharing a piece
of secret information, known as the secret, among a set of
participants in such a way that the secret can be reconstructed
from any shares, where a share is a private piece of informa-
tion distributed securely by a trusted dealer to each participant
on initial setup of the threshold scheme. The threshold structure
is the collection of subsets of whose shares can collectively
be used to reconstruct the secret, in other words
All the threshold schemes discussed in this paper are perfect in
the sense that knowledge of shares contributes no infor-
mation to knowledge of the secret, and unconditionally secure
in the sense that the security of the system does not depend on
the difficulty of factorization, etc.
Threshold schemes are useful cryptographic primitives with
many different applications. Examples include access control,
protection of a cryptographic key, group signature protocols,
and controlled key recovery. All these applications have in
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common the need to distribute trust in a secret parameter
among a number of different entities. For more details of some
applications see, for example, [19].
There is a significant communication cost involved in setting
up a -threshold scheme since the dealer must use secure
channels to distribute each participant’s share to them. There
are many applications where such a one-off cost can be toler-
ated, but where it is not practical to assume the existence of such
secure channels after the setup process has completed. For ex-
ample, root cryptographic keys are often protected by threshold
schemes where shares of the key are distributed manually to par-
ticipants. This manual distribution process represents a tempo-
rary secure channel between the dealer and each participant that
may not be practical to reactivate at a later date (the participants
might be based in different countries, for example).
This raises the interesting question as to whether it is possible
to make changes to the basic parameters of a -threshold
scheme after the setup process has completed without having
to use secure channels. Such a change may be required for a
number of reasons: a set of participants might need to be re-
moved from the scheme (disenrollment), involving a reduction
in ; a set of participants might need to be added to the scheme
(enrollment), involving an increase in ; the security policy re-
lating to the threshold scheme might need to be strengthened
(threshold increase), involving an increase in ; or slackened
(threshold decrease), involving a decrease in ; or indeed any
combination of the above.
An impractical solution to this problem would be for the
dealer to distribute to each participant at setup not only a share
in the original -threshold scheme, but also one share in
every possible threshold scheme that might be required
in the future. To change parameters it would suffice that the
dealer use a public channel to broadcast a message instructing
participants to start using the appropriate new shares. However,
this solution generally requires each participant to store an
excessive number of unnecessary shares.
It is, therefore, desirable to investigate threshold schemes
where participants do not hold excessively large shares (we
will be interested in them holding shares of minimal size), but
where the dealer can still use a public channel to broadcast
some information that enables the threshold scheme parameters
to change. Each participant in the “new” threshold scheme
can determine their share exclusively from the information
that they received on system setup and the broadcast message.
We assume that the dealer anticipates that a future parameter
change may be necessary before issuing the initial shares. This
allows the dealer to build the capability for parameter change
into the threshold scheme at setup. Without this assumption
0018-9448/$20.00 © 2005 IEEE
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there are only a few types of parameter change that can be
enabled using only broadcast channels (see Section VI).
The schemes that we look at will vary depending on the
amount of knowledge that the dealer has about what future
parameter changes will be needed. For reasons that we make
clear in Section III, the following three cases are of particular
interest.
• The dealer anticipates that the threshold may decrease (but
not by how much) and that some participants may need to
be disenrolled (but does not know how many).
• The dealer anticipates that the threshold may increase (but
not by how much) and that some participants may need to
be disenrolled (but does not know how many).
• The dealer anticipates that the threshold may change (but
does not know whether it will increase or decrease) and
that some participants may need to be disenrolled (but
does not know how many).
Threshold schemes capable of changing their parameters
within the same communications network context as this paper
have been studied by a number of authors. A lower bound on
the necessary share size to enable sequential disenrollment of
participants in a threshold scheme was given in [4]. Both [4] and
[15] demonstrated the optimality of this bound by providing
different threshold schemes that met this lower share bound. In
[5], a framework was provided for studying this problem for
secret sharing schemes (a generalization of threshold schemes)
and the lower bound on share size proved in [4] was generalized
for this environment.
We are interested in not just minimizing the share size, but
also the necessary broadcast information to enable a change in
the parameters of a threshold scheme. In [2], a lower bound was
shown for the amount of broadcast information necessary in the
sequential disenrollment schemes of [4], [15]. In this paper, we
significantly extend this work by looking at general parameter
changes for threshold schemes. In particular, we will provide
lower bounds on the size of broadcast message necessary to
enable any type of meaningful change to the parameters of a
threshold scheme that already has minimal share size. The fol-
lowing is a simplified version of our main theorem (Theorem
15).
Theorem: Consider a –threshold scheme with
on a participant set with a secret to be updated via a broad-
cast to , any –threshold access structure with secret
on a subset of . Let be the associated broadcast. Sup-
pose that each participant holds a share of minimal size (that






case a is and
case b is and and
case c is and and
We also show that these bounds are optimal by exhibiting
schemes that meet these bounds.
Note that our communications environment differs from the
one on which the redistribution techniques of [7], [9], [16] can
be used to change the parameters of a threshold scheme. In re-
distribution environments there is no secure channel from the
dealer to the participants to enable parameter change, but there
do exist secure channels between the participants themselves.
We make no such assumption here. The problem under discus-
sion here is also related, but different, to the concept of proactive
threshold schemes [10], where broadcast messages are used to
refresh shares, but not to change the parameters of the threshold
scheme.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Sec-
tion II, we introduce the necessary preliminary concepts about
threshold schemes. In Section III, we present the model we use
and discuss the methodology of the paper. In Section IV, we
present some preliminary results using the model for dynamic
threshold schemes. In Sections V–VII, we consider three dif-
ferent types of parameter change and establish lower bounds
on the broadcast size for share-minimal threshold schemes en-
abling such changes to be made. We establish the optimality
of these bounds in Section VIII by demonstrating optimal con-
structions of dynamic threshold schemes and present a small
example to illustrate the construction. In Section IX, we discuss
two possible avenues for further work. Appendix I contains the
proofs of Theorems 12 and 14.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Since the threshold schemes that we discuss here are uncon-
ditionally secure (their security is independent of cryptographic
assumptions on the strength of an adversary), we follow the pop-
ular convention (first proposed by [14]) of modeling them in in-
formation-theoretic terms. We will formally define a threshold
scheme within this context.
A. Introduction to Information Theory
We provide a short introduction to entropy here, but refer the
reader to, for example, [8] for details.
For ease of translation from sets to random variables,
throughout this paper we adopt the following conventions: if
and are finite sets then we simplify to and the
singleton set to (hence, represents the set ,
etc.).
Let be a finite set. Let be a finite collection of tuples,
such that the entries of a tuple are indexed by the
elements of . Let be a probability distribution on . For
and , let and let
. Let be the marginal distribution on
, that is, is the probability distribution on such that for
we have
Let . We use the notation
to denote the set of tuples indexed by with the
associated probability distribution .
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The entropy of is defined to be
We remark that the base of the logarithm is not specified here,
but can be chosen to be any convenient value. Where there is
no ambiguity, we will write for and for . Let
and let . For , we have the conditional
probability
We may write for , so we can regard
as a probability distribution on . The conditional entropy
of is defined to be
The conditional entropy of given is defined to
be
and it can be shown that
(1)
Note that if then and are independent
variables and so . Hence,
implies that .
For , the mutual information of and
given is defined to be
and so
(2)
If , we write for . The following





Let be a set of participants, let be the
secret, and let be an integer with .
Definition 1: A -threshold scheme is a
probability distribution defined on a collection of tuples ,
each of which is indexed by the elements of , such that for
if
if .
We call the elements of distribution rules. Note that these
are the tuples of that occur with nonzero probability. In
order to implement a threshold scheme, the collection of
distribution rules is made public. A dealer privately selects a
distribution rule with probability ,
then securely distributes as a share to , for .
The element is the secret, and is kept private.
We call the size of the share associated with partici-
pant , and the size of the secret. It can be seen (for ex-
ample, [20]) that in any threshold scheme . If
for all such then we say that the threshold
scheme is ideal. Ideal -threshold schemes can be found
for all integers . We describe two examples that are
used in Section VIII.
Example 2 (Shamir [17]): Let , let be
a prime, and let be the field of integers modulo . Sup-
pose is an integer with . A dealer gener-
ates distinct, nonzero elements of and publishes
them. The dealer then secretly and randomly chooses elements
and forms the polynomial
For , the share is issued to participant
and the value of the secret is . It is straightforward to
verify that any participants can determine by polyno-
mial interpolation, but any participants can obtain
no information about the value of , additional to the fact
that it is in . In this case, there are distribution rules
in , corresponding to the
values of the -tuple . Since is uniform,
we have that and thus that the scheme
is ideal.
Example 3: An equivalent way to construct an ideal
-threshold scheme uses a geometric construction in
PG (for a background in projective geometry
see [11]). Let be a mapping that assigns to each
participant as share a point on a normal rational curve
in and assigns the secret to be a further point on this
curve. If participants pool their shares, these shares span
and so they can obtain the secret. If participants
pool their shares, these shares span a -dimensional
subspace which contains no further point of the normal rational
curve, so in particular does not contain . They thus have no
information about the secret . To see how to extract the
distribution rules of an ideal -threshold scheme from this
configuration of points see, for example, [13] or [20].
C. Restrictions and Contractions
In order to define our model rigorously, we will make
use of two types of threshold schemes that can be derived
from an existing threshold scheme. The restriction of a
-threshold scheme to a subset of participants is the
-threshold scheme that results from effectively dis-
carding the shares held by the other participants. The
contraction of a -threshold scheme at a set of shares is
the -threshold scheme that results from effectively
broadcasting this set of shares.
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More generally, let be a probability distribution on a finite
collection of tuples indexed by the finite set . For ,
the restriction to of the pair is the pair . For
and , the contraction at of
the pair is the pair . Restrictions and con-
tractions of threshold schemes are formalised by the following
two results from [12].
Theorem 4 (Restriction): [12] Let be a
-threshold scheme and let . Then
is a -threshold scheme, known as the restriction of
to .
Theorem 5 (Contraction): [12] Let be a
-threshold scheme. Let , let and let
. Then
is a -threshold scheme, known as the contraction
of at .
III. DYNAMIC THRESHOLD SCHEMES
In this paper, we are interested in threshold schemes where
the parameters can later be changed by means of a public
channel broadcast. In this section, we first comment on the
special case of enrollment. We then propose a simple extension
of the model of a threshold scheme within which to analyze
dynamic threshold schemes.
A. Enrollment
There is one type of parameter change that cannot be easily
accommodated in the communication network environment that
we propose. Enrollment of new participants who were not issued
with any private information at system setup is impossible in a
broadcast-only network. The reason for this is that each new
participant needs to acquire some private information from the
dealer, which clearly needs the involvement at some stage of a
secure distribution channel. The only ways in which enrollment
could be performed are as follows.
• A secure channel is set up between the dealer and any new
enrolling participants to issue them with shares.
• All possible future participants are issued with a crypto-
graphic key at system setup. These participants are then
effectively “sleeping participants” until the time of enroll-
ment, when the dealer broadcasts their share to them, en-
crypted under the key that they were issued at setup. This
is essentially the same technique used in [18] to remotely
activate threshold schemes.
• Existing participants transfer necessary information using
secure channels to new enrolling participants (this is out-
side our communications model, but is appropriate in the
redistribution environments mentioned in Section I).
For this reason, we do not consider enrollment in the rest of this
paper, and acknowledge that if enrollment is required then se-
cure channels must be established using one of the above tech-
niques.
B. A Model for Dynamic Threshold Schemes
Let be a set of participants and be a secret. Let be a
collection of threshold structures defined on subsets of (in
other words, for each there exist , , and
such that is a -threshold structure defined on ).
We wish to establish a -threshold scheme defined on
that has the capability of being changed by means of a broadcast
message into a scheme with threshold structure , where can
be any of the threshold structures in . We denote the secret after
this change by . We will also make the reasonable assumption
throughout that
(6)
Each is associated with a broadcast variable , which
represents the broadcast message that the dealer will send if he
wishes to change to the threshold structure . We let
Definition 6: A -threshold scheme
that can be updated to , is a probability distribution defined
on a collection of tuples (each of which is indexed by
the elements of ) such that
(A) restricted to is a -threshold scheme on
with secret , that is,
if
if
(B) For each threshold structure , if is a
-threshold structure on then contracted
at is a -threshold scheme on
with secret , that is,
if
if
In other words, is initially a -threshold scheme.
If the broadcast message is sent on a public channel then
knowledge of the original shares and this broadcast result in
also becoming a -threshold scheme defined on .
Note that in Definition 6 we do not care whether a set of par-
ticipants belonging to can obtain prior to knowledge of
the broadcast . It is foreseen that in most anticipated applica-
tions that will not have any relevant meaning until the point
at which the dealer initiates a parameter change (for example,
may be the backup master key that the dealer will only activate
in the event that a parameter change is necessary).
We are interested first in minimizing the size of shares held
by each participant, which is measured by . We are then
interested in minimizing the size of the broadcast , which is
measured by . In this paper, for a number of different
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Fig. 1. Selected regions to which threshold schemes can be updated.
sets , we will determine the minimal size of broadcast neces-
sary in a share minimal threshold scheme that can be updated
to . Whereas lower bounds on share size are easily extracted
from existing work and tend to be “expected,” lower bounds on
broadcast size are neither established nor particularly intuitive.
For example, it would seem intuitive that broadcast size should
depend on the set , and that larger sets will require larger
broadcasts, but we prove the slightly surprising result that the
minimal broadcast size is “fairly independent” of .
We proceed by identifying some “sensible” sets to study.
First, observe that if a lower bound holds for updating to then
it also holds for updating to any region . We thus iden-
tify some meaningful “large” regions to investigate, and in
Section VII-B will show that updating to “smaller” regions gen-
erally does not result in smaller broadcast sizes.
The three main regions that we study are as follows.
1) Threshold increases. The dealer wants it to be possible to
change to any threshold structure with a greater threshold
parameter. In other words, all -threshold structures
with and . We denote this set by ,
or when no ambiguity arises.
2) Threshold decreases. The dealer wants it to be possible to
change to any threshold structure with a smaller threshold
parameter. In other words, all -threshold structures
with and . We denote this set by ,
or simply . For reasons that will later be explained, we
partition into (corresponding to )
and (corresponding to ).
3) The general case. The dealer wants it to be possible to
change to any -threshold structure with .
We denote this set by , or simply . Clearly,
.
An example of a smaller region of interest is where and
(this corresponds to disenrollments). We return to this
is Section VII-B. The listed regions are illustrated in Fig. 1.
A natural question to ask is: What is the relation between
and ? We show in the next section that if (region )
or if ( and) (region ) then and
are necessarily independent (Lemma 8). In the remaining case
(region ), we can have . This is
discussed in Section VI-A.
In the following sections we look at these different regions
in turn and determine lower bounds on the broadcast size for
updating to them. In Section V, we look at , in Section VI,
we look at , and in Section VII, we look at and discuss the
possibility of improving these results for smaller update regions.
We begin with some preliminary results.
IV. PRELIMINARY RESULTS FOR DYNAMIC
THRESHOLD SCHEMES
Let be a -threshold scheme with
that can be updated to , some collection of -threshold
structures with . (The case is considered in Sec-
tion VI-A and will not be considered further in this paper.) Let
be the threshold structure on .
We first prove three lemmas that we will need later. The first
lemma notes that for a large class of regions the secrets and
must be independent.
Lemma 7: If there exists with (that is, there
exists a set with but ), then
.
Proof: Suppose , so there exists a set
with but . Suppose . As
, we have
contradicting (B) in Definition 6. Hence .
Lemma 8: For or , and are independent.
Proof: If then so and Lemma
7 gives the result. Now consider . Let . If
then and so , contradicting the
definition of . Thus, and so there exists
with so . Now if and
only if , if and only if , if and only if
, if and only if (region ).
Thus, if (region ) then and so, by
Lemma 7, and are independent.
Note that in the region , it is possible to have and
. This is discussed in Section VI-A.
The next observation is an adaptation of a result in [6].
Lemma 9: If there exists , , and sets
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as and
by (4)
Lemma 10: Consider any probability distribution on a set




V. INCREASING THE THRESHOLD
In this section, we consider the case of increasing the
threshold, that is, we look at updating to threshold structures in
. We first need to establish exactly what the minimal share
size is for this case.
Theorem 11: Let be a -threshold
scheme with that can be updated to . Then
a) and are independent;
b) for each participant , .
Proof: Let be a -threshold structure on with
. Let be the -threshold structure on , so .
Part a) follows from Lemma 8. For part b), for , let
be a set of size and . Applying Lemma
9 and (6) we get .
We thus refer to a -threshold scheme that can be updated
to and has for all as share minimal.
Theorem 12: Let be a share minimal -
threshold scheme with that can be updated to .




The complete proof of this theorem is complex, see Ap-
pendix I-A for full details. We sketch the proof here to provide
an idea of how it works. Theorem 12 is proved by induction
on . We first prove the result for , that is, is an
threshold scheme and . We derive
two parts from , one part relating to and the other relating
to . We then find entropy results concerning the
participants, the broadcasts, and (see Lemmas 19 and 20 in
Appendix I-A). Using these results, we can prove the size of
the broadcast for (see Lemma 21 in Appendix I-A).
To prove the result for general , we assume that , we
contract on a subset of to obtain a
threshold scheme that can be updated to
for an appropriate choice of broadcast. Now we apply the result
for the case and Theorem 12 follows.
We will see in Section VIII that this bound is tight when
we demonstrate a share minimal scheme that also has minimal
broadcast size.
Recall that, as discussed immediately after Definition 6, our
model is not concerned with whether participants belonging to
can obtain prior to knowledge of the broadcast . It is
worth observing that if the model is restricted to make the extra
requirement that they cannot obtain , we get the simplified
bound .
VI. DECREASING THE THRESHOLD
In this section, we consider decreasing the threshold. We wish
to establish a lower bound on the broadcast size necessary for
a share minimal -threshold scheme that can be updated
to .
This case is interesting because there are a number of param-
eter sets within this region that any standard threshold scheme
can be updated to, without the need for extra share information
on scheme initialization. This partitions into two separate
regions and , with corresponding to all pairs
where , and corresponds to all pairs
where .
We will first discuss a special case arising as a result of this
issue and then deal with the two separate regions.
A. A Special Case: Region
The region is interesting because here and can be
equal. It is possible to update any standard -threshold
scheme to a -threshold scheme in by broadcasting
some selected share information that allows remaining par-
ticipants to continue using their original shares within a new
scheme. A simple example would be the fact that broadcasting
the share held by any participant effectively converts the
original scheme into a -threshold scheme, with that
participant “removed.” In such schemes there is no need to
distribute extra share information and so .
However, the region is otherwise artificial and providing
the general capability of decreasing the threshold normally in-
volves the inclusion of pairs outside this region, ex-
cept in one significant case. When , we have
and . This special case was studied in [1], where
it was shown that for schemes with the minimal share size of
, the minimal broadcast size is
We refer the reader to [1] for details, and for examples of
schemes with this minimal broadcast size.
B. Decreasing the Threshold When
For the rest of this section we thus only consider the case
. We first establish that in contrast to the special case
, when the size of shares in a -threshold
scheme that can be updated to is at least .
Theorem 13: Let be a -threshold
scheme with that can be updated to . Then
.
Proof: Let be a -threshold structure
on ( exists as ). Noting that , choose
to be a set of size and
to be a set of size disjoint from . Now let . The
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TABLE I
SHARE AND BROADCAST BOUNDS FOR UPDATING TO SOME SMALLER REGIONS U
sets , , satisfy the conditions of Lemma 9, so we have
by (6).
As in Section V, we refer to a scheme with the minimal share
size of for all as share minimal. The
main result of this section is the following.
Theorem 14: Let be a share minimal
-threshold scheme with that can be updated to




The complete proofs are in Appendix I-B, but we comment
on them here. We have already seen that the two regions
and are in some respects fundamentally different. In fact,
to prove a lower bound on the broadcast size for updating to
we need two different approaches for each of these two re-
gions. The method of proof for the region is similar to that
of Theorem 12. The proof for the region involves the fol-
lowing series of steps. The first step is to show that, for
with , and that for any ,
. This is proved by induction
on . The next step is to prove that
if is a threshold structure in . The final step
is to prove the result for by using induction on .
VII. UPDATING TO OTHER REGIONS
We have demonstrated lower bounds on the broadcast size
of share minimal threshold schemes that can be updated to have
lower, or higher threshold parameters. In this section, we briefly
consider the general case, where the threshold can be either in-
creased or decreased, and then discuss updating to smaller re-
gions.
A. Updating the Threshold to
By Theorems 11 and 13, it follows that any -threshold
scheme with that can be updated to has
for all . The following is immediate from Theo-
rems 12 and 14.
Theorem 15: Let be a share minimal -
threshold scheme with that can be updated to . Then,




We show in Section VIII that this lower bound is tight by
providing a scheme that meets it.
B. Updating to Smaller Regions
We have already established results for updating to the
regions , , and . Recall that, as remarked in Sec-
tion III-B, it is possible that these bounds can be reduced if we
only want to update to smaller regions.
The main problem with studying smaller regions is simply
that it is not obvious which smaller regions might be of interest
in genuine applications. Table I gives some examples of “sen-
sible” smaller regions . In general, they show that so long as
the update region is reasonably large then it is not possible to
have a share minimal -threshold scheme that can be up-
dated to using a smaller broadcast message than the bound of
Theorem 15. The proofs of most of these bounds are not pro-
vided here as they can either be derived from the proofs of re-
sults in previous sections, or can be derived in a similar manner.
A few of these cases, however, do deserve special mention.
Case 1 corresponds to the sequential disenrollment schemes
studied in [2], [4], [15]. In this case, considering only one dis-
enrollment, because only one participant will ever be removed
from the scheme it is possible to have a small broadcast size.
Case 5 ( ) and Case 6 are of interest because the con-
ditions for Lemmas 7 and 9 do not apply. In these cases, it is
possible to design schemes for updating to where and
for all . The broadcast bound indicated in
Table I is only one less than that of Theorem 15, and only when
. These cases, and proofs of their broadcast bounds, are
given in [1] (see also Section VI-A).
VIII. CONSTRUCTIONS
We now demonstrate that the bound on the broadcast size of
Theorem 15 (and thus also the bounds of Theorems 12 and 14) is
tight by constructing a share-minimal -threshold scheme
with that can be updated to with the minimal broad-
cast size indicated by Theorem 15.
We first indicate the idea behind the construction by demon-
strating an extended version of the Shamir threshold scheme (re-
call that Example 2 meets the broadcast bound in some, but not
all, cases). We then present a construction based on Example 3
that meets the bound of Theorem 15 in all cases.
Construction 16: (Using Shamir’s Scheme): We divide the
scheme into three phases.
Initialization: The dealer issues each participant in
with a share in each of two Shamir threshold
schemes, both defined on and “imaginary” participants
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. Scheme I is a -threshold scheme with
secret and Scheme II is an -threshold scheme
with secret . Let and be the polynomials corre-
sponding to Scheme I and Scheme II, respectively. The dealer
generates distinct nonzero values
in and publishes these. Each participant is given share
.
Before update: Participants can use their shares of Scheme I
to realize a -threshold scheme.
Update: Suppose that we wish the scheme to be updated to
, a -threshold structure on .
That is, we want to disenrol participants and
change the threshold parameter to . In order to activate ,
the dealer has two options.
1) The dealer indicates that participants should switch to
using their shares in Scheme II and broadcasts
Any participants in who pool their shares with the
broadcast shares know points on polynomial
of degree , so can uniquely determine
and obtain . However, any participants
in knowing the broadcast shares only have points
on and so obtain no information about . The result
of the broadcast is thus a -threshold scheme on .
The broadcast has size , which
only meets the bound of Theorem 15 in a few cases (for
example, when and ).
2) In the special case that , the dealer broadcasts the
values and
Any participants in who pool their shares with the
broadcast shares know points on polynomial
of degree , so can determine and hence,
also knowing , can determine . Similarly,
any participants obtain no information about . In
this case, the broadcast has size , which
meets the bound in Theorem 15 only if .
Construction 16 only meets the bound of Theorem 15 for
some parameters. We now give a general geometric construc-
tion based on Example 3 that meets the bound in all cases.
Construction 17: (Using a Geometrical Scheme): The
scheme is divided into three phases.
Initialization: The dealer issues each participant in
with a share in each of two geometric threshold
schemes, defined as follows.
1) Let be a set of “imaginary” partici-
pants. Denote and let be
a geometric -threshold scheme.
2) Let be a set of “imaginary” partici-
pants. Denote PG and let
be a geometric -threshold scheme.
The two shares held by each participant can be represented as a
single subspace by embedding and as disjoint subspaces in
PG and considering the share of participant
to be the subspace of .
Before update: Participants can use their shares of to realize
a -threshold scheme.
Update: Suppose that we wish the scheme to be updated to
, a -threshold structure on .
In order to activate , the dealer has two options.
1) Define subspaces and
of . In order to activate , the dealer broadcasts the
subspace by choosing a suitable set of
points of . As , we have
If a set of participants in pool their shares, then
is a subspace of dimension of which, by
the properties of a normal rational curve, is disjoint from
and hence . Thus, and together span ,
which contains , so the participants in can obtain
the secret .
For a set of participants we consider the set
. As , it follows that . The
set is generated by points of the normal rational curve,
hence,
By the properties of a normal rational curve, does not
contain any further point of the normal rational curve, so
in particular, does not contain . This implies that a max-
imal unauthorized -set together with the
participants and broadcast cannot obtain . The
result of the broadcast is thus a -threshold scheme
on . We refer to this construction process as updating
with . If then . If
then . So, updating with
achieves the bound of Theorem 15 in the following cases:
a) ; b) and .
2) For the remaining case, that is, and , we
describe a similar process referred to as updating with .
Although we show this for all , it is only optimal
for . Define subspaces and
of . In order to activate , the dealer broadcasts the
subspace , where
and also a point on the line in , where
. This gives a -threshold scheme
on with secret and with broadcast satisfying
Thus, for the case and , updating with
meets the bound of Theorem 15.
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Hence, we have shown that the bound in Theorem 15 can
always be met by either updating with or updating with .
Note also that if we wanted to make the assumption that the
participants cannot determine before the broadcast then we
would need to be an -threshold scheme, in which
case we would have
if and
otherwise.
We now give an example to illustrate and compare Construc-
tions 16 and 17.
Example 18: Suppose we start with , a -threshold
scheme on , and we want to update to
, a -threshold scheme on . We will
show how to update using both Constructions 16 and 17 and
show that Construction 17 results in a smaller broadcast size
than Construction 16. Note that is in the region and so we
will use the first update option described in each construction.
We will work over GF , a large odd prime. We begin with
the polynomial Construction 16. Let and note
that Scheme I is a -threshold scheme on and Scheme
II is a -threshold scheme on . Suppose Scheme I
has associated polynomial and Scheme II has associated
polynomial
Suppose the public values for are ,
, , , and , and so their shares are
, respectively. To perform
the update to as in Construction 16, we need to broadcast
three pieces of information, namely, , , and .
This would enable an authorized set in to obtain by
completely determining all the coefficients of .
We can think of this polynomial Scheme II as a geometric
construction in PG as follows. We can represent ’s in-
formation in Scheme II as
In the geometric interpretation, we think of
as a point in PG associated with participant . Thus, each
participant is associated with a point on a normal rational curve
as described in Example 3. (A similar interpretation applies for
Scheme I.)
Thus, by using this geometric interpretation, we can illustrate
how to update from the polynomial to using Construc-
tion 17. Using the same notation as in the construction, let be
a geometric -threshold scheme on (such
that corresponds to the polynomial using the above
interpretation). Let . This, subspace is repre-
sented by the matrix equation
where
We note that the connection between the polynomial scheme
and the geometrical scheme is through the matrix . In the
polynomial scheme, if we know , we know all linear
combinations of the equations represented by . In the
geometric interpretation, this corresponds to the following: if we
know the points represented by , then we know all the linear
combinations of these points, that is, we know the subspace
generated by these points. Thus, the geometrical scheme is a
straightforward generalization of the polynomial scheme. Note
that in the polynomial scheme, broadcast information is limited
to points on the polynomial. However, in the geometric scheme,
the broadcast information is more flexible (which is why we
can obtain smaller broadcasts). In the geometric scheme, broad-
cast information is not limited to points on the normal rational
curve, we can broadcast any point in PG . To broadcast
the point PG , we broadcast the value
, that is, we can broadcast any linear combina-
tion of the coefficients of .
We now use this geometric setup to show how Construc-
tion 17 performs the required update. We need one imaginary
participant ; suppose has public value . We cal-
culate , with matrix equation ,
where
Row reducing yields
and so a general point of has form
To find where intersects we first row reduce to obtain
So the general point of is in if and only if it is a linear
combination of the rows of , that is,
So if and only if ,
that is, . Hence,
. Thus, the broadcast information is the two
values
We now verify that authorized sets can obtain the secret .
The authorized set knows the following matrix equa-
tion whose four rows correspond to and ’s shares, and the
broadcast values and
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To show that can be calculated, we apply row operations to
show that the vector is in the row space of the left-hand
matrix. This is so since the row reduced form of that matrix is
Similarly, for the remaining authorized sets and
. We do not need to check the unauthorized sets as the
span of any four points on the normal rational curve does not
contain any further point of the normal rational curve, so does
not contain .
Hence, using Construction 17, we only need to broadcast two
pieces of information compared to three pieces for Construc-
tion 16. Note that with Construction 16, authorized sets have
enough information to determine the entire polynomial .
However, with Construction 17, although authorized sets have
enough information to determine , they do not neces-
sarily have enough information to determine .
IX. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have established the minimal broadcast necessary to up-
date the parameters of a share-minimal threshold scheme, and
demonstrated an optimal scheme for achieving these bounds.
We showed these results for achieving one parameter update.
A natural question to consider is the situation where we want
more than one, say two updates. If on is updated to on
(using ), then updated to on (using ), we




The next step would be to investigate the independence of the
secrets , , and . Under what circumstances would it hold
that ?
Third, for which access structures and update collections
(containing ) and (containing ) do we need to have
?
Fourth, we would expect the same bounds for as for
and so we could extend Construction 17 in Section VIII
by having an extra imaginary participants in schemes
and , and having a third scheme , a geometric
threshold scheme.
Another interesting generalization is to consider threshold
schemes that are not share-minimal. In such schemes, it is pos-
sible to reduce the broadcast size at the expense of an increase
in the amount of information stored as shares. As mentioned
in Section I, the extreme case of this concession is to give par-
ticipants one share for every possible new threshold parameter
set and then simply broadcast a message indicating which new
set of shares to move to in order to enable the new parameter
change. The pattern of the intermediate tradeoffs between this
extreme case and the share-minimal schemes discussed in this
paper remains undetermined and would be worthy of further in-
vestigation.
APPENDIX
PROOFS OF MAIN THEOREMS
A. Proof for Theorem 12
We proceed to prove this result by induction, commencing
with the case and then the general case.
Increasing the Threshold: The Case : We aim to prove
the lower bound on the broadcast size for the case . We
first prove two technical lemmas and then establish the bound
for this case.
Let and be a share-minimal
-threshold scheme that can be updated to . Let
be a -threshold structure on .
By share minimality we have for each .
Essentially, one part of each share can be thought of as relating
to the original -threshold structure and the other part
can be thought of as relating to the new threshold structure
. To see this, we factor out the first part by
letting and defining a new probability distribution on
by . The following lemma shows that
is “almost” a -threshold scheme.




d) for any .
Proof: By definition we have
(7)
for all (8)
Part a) follows immediately by noting that Theorem 11 a) im-
plies that . Now choose , . It follows
from the definition of conditional entropy that
(9)
as implies .
To prove part c), let . By (7) and (9) it follows that
, as required. For part d), let and
choose . Since
for all , by (8) and (9) it follows that
, as required.
Finally, for part b), apply Lemma 10 to parts c) and d) to
obtain , the equality by a). As
it follows that for all .
We now prove some further properties of before estab-
lishing the bound.
Lemma 20: With respect to we have the following.
a) The variables are independent.
b) For , we have .
c) If is a -set then .
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Proof:
a) To show independence, we show that
Let be the -threshold structure on
. From Lemma 19 c) and d) we have
and
Applying Lemma 10 we get
The result follows by Lemma 19 b).
b) Let be the -threshold structure.
Then, for , . Thus, by Lemma 19 d)
and so
c) Using the results of Section II-A,
by Lemma 19 c)
by Lemma 19 d)
by Lemma 19 b)
Hence equality holds throughout.
We can now prove the lower bound on the size of broadcast
for the case .
Lemma 21: Let be a share minimal -
threshold scheme with that can be updated to .




Proof: Let be a -threshold structure
defined on .
For we have
by Lemma 19 b). For we have
by Lemma 20 c). So
(10)
If , then by Lemma 20 a) the are independent, and so
by Lemma 20 b). Hence, by Lemma 20 a)
If , then by Lemma 20 we have
by Lemma 20 b)
by Lemma 20 a)
Thus, in both cases we have .




As , the theorem follows, as re-
quired.
Increasing the Threshold: The General Case: We are now
ready to prove Theorem 12 by induction on .
If then the result is proved by Lemma 21. Suppose
. Let be a -set and let . Let
and let the probability distribution on
be defined by As , it follows that
.
Let be the scheme corresponding to . In or-
der to apply Lemma 21, we now show that is a -
threshold scheme that can be updated to , for
an appropriate choice of broadcast.
Let . Now so
as required. Since , and so
. Part (A) of Definition 6 is thus satisfied.
Let be an -threshold access
structure on . Let be the -threshold structure
on with and . We
show that is the broadcast variable for in . Let
be an -set, so . Since can be updated to ,
. This implies that
and so . Now let . Since
it follows from Section II-A that
Since , and so .
Part (B) of Definition 6 is thus also satisfied.
So we have a -threshold scheme which can
be updated to a -threshold access
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Since we have already shown that , and since
and Theorem 12 is proved.
Finally, we note that if the model is restricted to include the
extra requirement that the participants belonging to cannot
obtain prior to knowledge of the broadcast (in other words,
) then it follows that
and from (10) we get the simplified bound of
instead of the bound in Theorem 12.
B. Proof for Theorem 14
We have already seen that the two regions and are in
some respects fundamentally different. In fact, to prove a lower
bound on the broadcast size for updating to we need two
different approaches for each of these two regions. We prove
these results separately in Theorems 23 and 24. The bound in
Theorem 14 then follows immediately.
Decreasing the Threshold: Updating to : Recall that our
aim is to establish a bound for updating to . In this subsec-
tion, we consider schemes for updating to but will only be
concerned with how big the broadcast size is in the case that the
new threshold parameters belong to . We proceed by induc-
tion on the new threshold parameter, first proving the bound for
updating to and then for updating to general .
Lemma 22: Let be a share minimal -
threshold scheme with that can be updated to . Then
for any -threshold structure defined on ,
.
Proof: Let be a -threshold structure on .
Since we have . Let be
a set of size , let be a set of size disjoint
from and let .
As in the proof of Theorem 13, , , and satisfy the con-
ditions of Lemma 9. As and ,




It follows from (13) that and are independent.
For each , define a new probability distribution
on by . From (13) it follows that
and so
(14)
Also by (13), and so
(see Section II-A). Since we have
and thus . By
Lemma 10, it follows that and hence,
. By (11) and (14) it follows that
(15)
Let . Now consider updating to , a -threshold struc-
ture on . So , that is,
and
So by Lemma 10, . It follows that
and (16)
Returning to , let . Then
by (15). Further, for , as , we have
by (16)
Hence for . For ,
by (15). So
(17)










by (17) and (19)
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Thus, we have
as required.
Theorem 23: Let be a share minimal -
threshold scheme with that can be updated to . Then
for any , where is a -threshold structure,
.
Proof: The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 12. If
, then the result is proved by Lemma 22. Suppose
and is defined on . Let be a –set and
. Let and let the probability distribution
on be defined by .
Let be the scheme corresponding to . In
a similar way as in the proof of Theorem 12 it can be shown
that is a -threshold scheme
which can be updated to , with
. It can be further shown that the
broadcast for a -threshold structure on is , where
is the -threshold structure on .
The broadcast corresponding to the -threshold
structure on is thus . By Lemma 22 we have
However, by definition
Thus, , as required.
Decreasing the Threshold: Updating to : We now prove
the complementary result to Theorem 23. Thus, we consider
schemes for updating to but will only be concerned with
how big the broadcast size is in the case that the new threshold
parameters belong to .
Theorem 24: Let be a share minimal -
threshold scheme with that can be updated to . Then,
for any , where is a -threshold structure, we
have
Proof: We divide the proof into three steps. In Step 1, we
prove that for
(20)
In Step 2, for as in the theorem and with
a -threshold structure (so ), we will prove
that
(21)
In Step 3, we complete the proof of the theorem.
We begin our proof. We note that since can be updated to
, (16) from the proof of Lemma 22 is valid. That is,
(22)
Step 1. We first show that for any –set of , with
(23)
We will do this by induction on on the class of share minimal
-threshold schemes with which can be updated to
. If then for as the
scheme is share-minimal. Our inductive hypothesis will be that
(23) holds for all -threshold schemes with .
For a -threshold scheme with
, let and let . Define on by
.
It can be shown that is a share-minimal
-threshold scheme with , which
can be updated to . By inductive hypothesis,
for any set of of size
( ). But , so
Hence,
proving (23).
Now let be a –set, and let with
Thus, and . How-
ever, we have
(as ), which is equal to
by (23). Hence,
(24)
We now prove (20). Let . If then (20) holds by
(23). So suppose . Write for
a –subset of . Let . By (22) and
(24)
for , and so
proving (20) for the case .
Step 2. Let be as in the theorem and let
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Now
by (25) and (26). Hence,
(27)
If let for some , otherwise,
and let . Now
(28)
Now by (22), and by (20) we have
. Further, if , then
(29)
Combining (28) and (29)
Now if then . Otherwise, and, as
, . Thus, , proving
(21).
Step 3. We now let be a -threshold
structure. If the result follows by (21). Suppose .
We proceed in a similar manner as in the proof of Theorem
23. Let be a –set and let . Let
probability distribution on be defined by
. It can be shown that is
a share minimal -threshold scheme
which can be updated to with
. For
where is -threshold on , the broadcast is where
is the access structure on .
Hence, is the broadcast in for , where is the
-threshold structure on . By (21) we have
Now
so , proving the theorem.
The bound in Theorem 14 now follows immediately from
Theorems 23 and 24.
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